Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1941

Aileen Webb v. Herbert A. Snow, Erastus P. Snow,
Ann Pymm Snow, Evalyn S. Decker and Agnes S.
Gallacher : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Judd, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Webb v. Snow et al, No. 6381 (Utah Supreme Court, 1941).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/790

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

,

'

Ip. the Supreme Court o~ the
. State of Utah >z_ .
'

'

AILEEN vv'"EBB '
'

.

'

Responclent,·l :(:_ ·-

_vs.

~,I
-·

.

HERBERT .A. SNO\V', ERASTUS-- P.
SNO\V;'

AAN PYMM SNOvV, EVA~

~~-~L~C~~~E~ and

AGNES
-

(

·\~ .> No. 6381-

~- -~ .. /7f.jf;.-.-.·..

.Ap~llants.

)

: _. .

.. , .
•

'

I

'

-

~~~~;,/

-:

I

;

______.,. . . _, '{v'
;·

'

,r--.

-

I"

-

-BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
I'
-"
-

I

.

-

__ .-.._i

JUDD,· RAY, QUINNEY· & NEBEKER;r--"
Attorneys for Appellants.

J.r

.

I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------

1

Statement of Errors ---------------------------------------------------------Alrgument .... ________ ..... _-------------------- ____ . _______ __ _____ ______ ___ ___ _____

11
22

I. Appellants' Theory ·········-------------------------------.. -----

22.

II. Assignments of Error having to do with Pregnacy and Miscarriage ······-----------------------------------·

24

1. Assignments of error Nos. 1 and 2 ........

24

2. Assignments of error Nos. 13 and 14......

27

III. Assignments of Error B:ased on Admission of
Evidence Under Cross-Examination____________________

38

1. Assignment of error No. 3 --------------------

38

2. Assignments of error Nos. 4 and 5........

42

IV. Assignments of Error Based Upon Refusal to
Give Appellants' Requested Instructions ............

43

1. Assignment of error No. 6 ·····--------------·

43

2. Assignment of error No. 7 --------------------

44

3. Assignment of error No. 9 ·····-·········-----

45

4. Assignment of error No. 8 --------------------

46

5. Assignment of error No. 10 ...................

51

6. Assignment of error No. 11 ------------------

52

7. Assignment of error No. 12 ---------·--------

54

8. Assignment of error No. 15 .........................

56

V. Errors Based Upon Instructions Given to Jury...

58

1. Assignment of error No. 16 ..................

58

2. Assignments of error Nos. 17 and 18....

60

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
3. Assignment of error No. 19 ------------------

61

4. Assignments of error Nos. 20 and 21____

62

VI. Errors in Instructions as to Damages ----------------

65

1. Assignments. of error Nos. 22 and 23____

65

VII. The Judgment is Excessive and is not Sustained
by !.Aw ------------------------------------------------------------------

68

1. Assignment of error No. 24 --------------------

68

VIII. ·Court Erred in D·enying Motion for New TriaL___

69

1. Assignment of error No. 25 ---------------··---

69

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·INDEX OF CASES CITED
Page
Armuleuis v. Koblitz (Ohio) 150 N. E. 620 ................

45

Annarina v. Boland ( Md.) 111 Atl. 84 ··············--··········

40

Bradburn Motors Co. v. Moverman (R. I.) 7 A. (2d)
207, point ( 5) ············-·-···········----------------------------------

41

Chesrown v. Bevier, (Ohio) 128 N. E. 94 ·········------··-······

46

Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Garman (Kentucky, 1930)
26 s. w. (2d) 20 --------------------------------------------············

33

Cristofaro v. Brenfleck, 184 A. (N. J.) 619, point ( 5) ....

41

Edenfield, et al v. Wheless, et al (Louisiana, 1934) 151
So. 659 ·········---------------------------------------------------------------

32

Essex v. l\1 illikan, et al (Ind.) 164 N. E. 284 ---------------·····

40

Ford v. Nicol, et al (Michigan, 1933) 246 N. W. 130....

35

Johnson v. Huntsman, 60 Utah 402', 209 Pac. 197____________

53

Johnson v. Richards (Idaho) 294 Pac. 507 --------------------

39

Jones, et al, v. Pierce, et al (Louisiana, 1935) 162 So.
215 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29

Kent v. Cole (Mich.) 98 N. W. 168 ---------------···················

44

Maloney v. ,Carey, (N.J.) 9 A. (2d) 791, point (3) ......

41

Miller v. Trascher (La.) 145 So. 27 --------············------------

56

Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., et al, 75 Ut. 87, 283
Pac. 160 ----------------------------------------------------------------------

58

Morris v. McClellan (Ala.) 45 So. 641 ............................49-61
Oklahoma Hospital v. Brown (Okla.) 208 Pac. 787 ........

25

Pratt v. Utah Light and Traction, 57 Utah 7, 169 Pac.
868 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

57

Roberson v. Stokes, et al (N. C.) 106 S. E. 151 ------------

49

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Skidmore v. Oklahoma Hospital (Okla.) 278 Pac. 334..

25

State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah
416, 22 Pa:c. ( 2d) 612 ----------------------------------------------

59

State v. Hannah, 81 Utah 580, 21 Pac. (2d) 537 --------------

64

St. Louis Mining & Smelting Co., et al v. State Industrial Commission (Okla.) 241 Pac. 170 --------------------

26

State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 28, 163 Pac. 789 ------------------

63

Swinney v. Wright ('Ga.) 132 S. E. 228-9 ----------------------

45

Symington v. Graham (Maryland, 1933) 169 A. 316________

35

Vitale v. Biando (Mo.) 52 S. W. (2d) 24 ____________________65-67
Wallace v. Portland Ry. L. P. Co. (Or.) 170 Pac. 283 ____ 65-66
Wingfield v. McClintock, et al (Kan.) 116 Pac. 488 --------

42

Wise v. Schneider, (Ala.) 88 So. 662 ------------------------------

41

TEXTS
2 Reid's Branson Inst., 96, 98 and 99, 106 Sec. 753 .... 44-45-56

6 C.

J.

Sec. 815 and 816, 819 and 820 ----------------------------48-53

~ R. C. L. 559 --------------------------------------------------------------------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

53

In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

AILEEN WEBB,
Respondent,
Ill•

Ill :·!

vs.

HERBERT A. SNOW, ERASTUS P.
SNOW, ANN PYMM SNO·W, EVALYN S. DE·CKER and AGNES S.
GALLACHER,
Appellants.

No. 6381

J

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this case the appellee sued appellants for dam. ages suffered as a result of an alleged assault and battery
taking place on the loading platform of the Giant Racer
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at Saltair Beach on the evening of June 22, 1940. This
appeal is for the purpose of securing a reversal of a
judgment in the trial court of Honorable P. C. Evans,
wherein the appellee recovered a judgment against the
appellants, based upon a verdict of the jury, for the
sum of $5,022.50.
At the time of the alleged assault the appellant5
were the owners and operators of that certain amusement device known as the Giant Racer, which they operated under separate ownership from, but in connection with Saltair Beach. The payment of the admission to Saltair did not entitle one to ride the Racerthat called for an additional fee, ·which appellee, or
any of her party, never paid or offered to pay. In order
to facilitate the operations of said device there has· been
provided by the appellants and their predecessors in interest, a platform· upon which the patrons coming to
ride the racer approach the cars that run upon two sets
of tracks that course the racer.
The approach to the racer loading platforms, together with the tracks upon which the cars operate, and
the fences maintained as a part of said platform, are
all set out in the following drawing ·which conforms to
a blackboard drawing used for purposes of illustration
at the time of the trial. This drawing has been approved by counsel for appellee, ·who agree that the same
may be used as illustrative of the condition existing on
the premises at the time complained of in this case.
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In operating the racer the appellants employed four
men all of whom worked on 'the platform marked "A,"
which platform is from eighteen inches to two feet lower than Platform "C" the loading platform. Sam
Whitehead managed the operation of the racer and
141 besides handled the brake lever at a point near the south
end of Platform "A." With this brake Mr. Whitehead controlled the cars as they completed their trip
around the racer and came into the loading station. On
the evening in question Mr. Whitehead never at any
time left his place of employment. The other three men
on the platform were employed as follows : When the
two cars, with three seats in each car making six seats
in all, would pull up for loading Jack Lampere would
take care of the people in the two front seats, John
Lampere the people in the two middle seats, and Earl
144 Cochran the people in the two rear seats. Each seat
had a capacity of two people to a seat, although sometimes three people rode in a seat. At the time in question Mr. Whitehead and the boys were operating only
the cars running on the west set of tracks since that set
was sufficient to take care of the people then desiring
to ride.
Jack Lampere's duty was to watch the cars on the
side operating and get them onto the cog chain that
pulled them out and up the first incline of the racer to
232 the apex of the first dip, from which point they started
on their trip around the racer by gravity. It was also his
duty to watch that people did not come down on the side
that was not running.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the four men
mentioned above were the only employees of appellants,
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that \vere in or arotmd the racer or had anything to do
with its operation on that night.
The appellee's evidence shows that Bernard L.
Bettilyon and the appellee are brother and sister and
that on the afternoon of June 22, 1940, Mr. Bettilyon,
i2 from about 3 :30 to i :30 had been attending a 20-30
i3 Club convention at theN ewhouse Hotel, and during that
time had had rna ybe six or seven cocktails; that about
7 :30 that evening Mr. Bettilyon drove Mr. Cottrell to
the Bettilyon home where Mrs. Cottrell already was, and
the two couples had dinner there together. At about
9:30, in Mr. Cottrell's car, they all went to the Saltair
Depot near the Fairgrounds and there boarded the train
for Saltair. At Saltair the group paid their admission
to the pavillion and went up to the dance floor, where
they danced two or three times. Upon leaving the dance
floor, about 10 :30 to 10 :45, and before the intermission at the dance floor, Mr. Bettilyon and his wife came
74 down to the foot of the pavillion stairs., where they met
the appellee and her husband, Kenneth Webb. From
that point the four of them went over to 1the racer and
stopped at the point marked "F" on the drawing above,
where they say they stayed for fifteen or twenty minutes waiting for a ride, the loading area serving the
76 cars on the west set of tracks being entirely filled up so
that people were blocked to about the end of the loading area. The west line cars were the only ones operated on the tracks at that time. There were two empty
cars standing on the east tracks near the loading platform, but the west cars were the only ones that were
running and these were sufficient to take care of the
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crowd acccording to the testimony of appellant's witness~s.

77

78

79

80

81

After standing there for some time Mr. Bettilyon
and his group moved further along toward the east, at
which point Mr. Bettilyon left his party with the statement that he would go down and get the boys to start
up the other cars, and went to point "L," where leaning
against the fence he spoke to one of the boys over on
the loading platform asking that they start the cars on
that side. He was told that they would be started later.
The conversation was in a friendly tone.
A little later he squatted down at about point "L"
and still continued to talk with the boys on the loading
platform. Eventually he said something to the effect that
since they didn't want their (his group's) money they
would take it and give it to another concession, and one
of the boys said that if they didn't like the service he
knew ·what he could do, and Mr. Bettilyon said that he
did, whereupon one of the boys said something to the
effect "to get the hell out of there, something like that
or mind my own business. and I said 'go jump in the
lake' and then turned and started north. I was a little
angry and I said 'go jump in the lake' and started on
out." The fellow who made the remark was over on
platform "A," the working platform..
He leaped
across and upon reaching Mr. Bettilyon turned him
around and shoved him back using both hands. Mr.
Bettilyon said he was completely taken off his feet but
he immediately swung at the appellant's employee and
missed him. "Employee flew right in and the next
moment we were fighting for all we were both worth."
Thereafter Mr. Bettilyon said that two other men
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came from the platform and started right in fighting,
so that at point "M'' on the drawing there were three
of them· on him. He kept moving to·ward the north end
of the platform, when Mr. Webb came in and started
pushing these fellows away saying, " 'Here, here, you
can't do this,' or something like that, 'there is no point
in all this.· Then he turned and said, 'Come on Lou,
let's get out of here' and I said 'Nothing would please
82 me more.'., Just about then Webb was hit and immediately the whole thing started again, two more men coming in until there were five or six men fighting Mr.
Webb and B·ettilyon. At point "0" Mr. Bettilyon was
knocked out.
In the former case Mr. Bettilyon testified: "He
(the man coming over from the loading platform)
88 turned me around, and shoved me, both. ~I swung immediately he stepped in and we were fighting."

95
%

At this point, from the testimony of Mrs. Bettilyon,
it appears that Mr. Webb was knocked to his knees, then
Mrs. Webb stepped out from behind the fence at about
point "P" and said to the man, " 'You can't do that to
my husband,' " and slapped him in the face and he
struck her knocking her down.
Mr. Webb by that time got to his feet and came
over and lifted her to a sitting position, patting her
cheeks, from which point she was taken over to a bench.
The appellant's evidence on these vital points is to
the effect that while Jack Lampere was collecting his
fares and getting the cars ready to go out he saw Mr.
Bettilyon and his party of four, of whom appellee was
one, stardng past point "G" on the drawing going to-
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ward the east side and he motioned them back toward
the west ; that three of 1he parties stopped near the
234 corner of the fence but Mr. Bettilyon kept going down to.
point "L"; that while on his way there Jack Lampere
motioned him two or three times to go back and at the
same time asked him to go !back on the other side. The
reason for trying to keep these people back, was that
with them around there other people would follow and
cause the boys trouble in their operation of the cars that
w.ere in operation on the west side. When Jack had gotten the car he was then loading on its way, he went back
and asked Mr. Bettilyon to go around on the other side,
whereupon Mr. Bettilyon said, "what other side," and
Jack told him the other side of the house, following
which there was some further conversation. Then Jack
235 went to tend to another car, Earl Cochran, taking care
146 of the two rear seats, followed up the conversation with
Mr. Bettilyon by asking him to go around on the other
side but Mr. Bettilyon just stood there while other
people continued to start around on the side where he
was and had to be waved back. After collecting for
one or two cars Earl again asked Mr. Bettilyon to go
around on the other side and he stood up and told Earl
to "put him around there, or I asked him to go out, is
what I asked him to do, and he says come and put him
around there, put him out, and I says 'well I will do
that.' " Earl then crossed from platform "A" to platform at point "L" where Mr. Bettilyon was standing.
Mr. Bettilyon was facing south and as Earl came up
on the platform, facing him "I asked him again to go out
and he took a swing at me * * * I grabbed hold of his
hands by the wrist * * * and held him for a minute there
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and tried to get him out and he wrenched loose from me
148 and started to fighting. I was just getting out of the
way of him as best I could * * * I never attempted to hit
him at all. Then Jack came over on the platform and
he swung at Jack and then Jack hit him." About this
time Mr. vVebb came down, "'I think he swung at Jack
and Jack hit him. I am not sure of that." Then J oh~
came over right after but before he came "there was
Jack and I and Mr. Bettilyon and Mr. Webb, and we
149 \vere right around points 'M' and 'N.'"
During all this time there was fighting going on.
About the time John came in Bernard Lynch, known as
150 ''Slim" came over. He was in civilian clothes and was
not working for the racer. "He took hold of Mr.
Bettilyon and said, 'I don't know what it is all about
but if Earl says you are going out you are going out.' "
'~Slim" took hold of Mr. Bettilyon by the arms from
behind. At this time they were over near point "0,"
and with "Slim'' holding Mr. Bettilyon and attempting
to get him out, the fight was over. Then Mr. Bettilyon
151 wrenched loose and started to fight again, that is when
Jack hit him, and about that time Mr. Cochran hit Mr.
Webb who was over between "G" and "F." At this
time Earl heard John say, "Watch out for him." This
was with reference to another strange man who came in
and took a swing at John and fell to the floor. Earl
did not see Mrs. Webb until he heard someone say that
"There is a woman been hit." When he looked around
he saw her in a sitting position on the floor. "She was
just sitting down crying. I never saw her stretched out
and unconscious." "Then Webb and I forgot our
fracas and Jack and I took her by. the arms and picked
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her up and Mr. Webb says, 'I will take care of her,' and
he took her."

133

Mrs. Webb, in giving her estimate of the time occupied by all the fight, said, "It wasn't a . long fight,
'absolutely the fastest thing I have ever seen.' ''

237

Jack Lampere's story of what happened to Mrs.
Webb was that after he had :hit Mr. Bettilyon, who had
fallen down, he looked around and saw Mr. Webb over
to the west from where he was standing and that just
.as he had taken a couple of steps toward Mr. Webb a
hand came around over his shoulder and hit him in the
face, without knowing who it was he turned around
quickly with his open hand which came in contact with
someone, he didn't know who at that time but afterwards found out that it was Mrs. Webb. Some man
said, "Who hit that woman?" and he turned around to
see Mrs. Webb sitting on the floor with her hands to
her face crying. Earl Cochran came over and he and
238 Jack each taking an arm picked her up off the floor and
gave her to Mr. Wehb.
Mrs. Webb first filed her complaint on September
6, 1940, setting out an entirely different set of facts than
that presented by her amended complaint filed December 12, 1940. ~It was not until she filed her amendment
that she set out that she had suffered a miscarriage as a
result of what happened.
Further facts as evidenced by the record will be
developed in the argument of the errors hereafter assigned in support of appellants' appeal.
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STATEMEN1' OF ERRORS
The errors of the trial court relied upon by appellants are
as follo,vs :
1. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to,
and permitting appellee as a witness in her own behalf to answer
the follovv~ing question on direct examination:
"Can you tell the court and jury whether or not
you 'vere pregnant on the evening of June 22, 1940 ?"
(Tr. 127.)
2. The court erred in denying appellants' motion to strike
the question set out in the next preceding assignment and the
answers thereto. (Tr. 128)
3. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to
the question asked by counsel on cross examination of appellants' witness Earl Cochran as follows :
"Now, you have described those duties you have
in connection with the collecting of fares. Is acting
as a bouncer for the ejection or eviction of people that
you think should be evicted, also a part of your duties?"
(Tr. 160)
4. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to
the question asked by counsel of appellee's witness Dr. Giesy
as follows:
"Doctor, assuming that the plaintiff in this case
had passed her regular menstrual period by about two
weeks, and that on June 22, 1940, she was struck a
blow of sufficient force to cause her to sit down violently, or to fall down on her back, and that some five or
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six days thereafter she suffered a severe vaginal hemorrhage, accompanied by large and numerous blood
clots, and that she thereafter so suffered and continued
to suffer hemorrhages and blood flow and clots for ten
days or two weeks thereafter, and that after that she
continued to hemorrhage up until approximately J anuary 1, 1941 : Taking all of these facts, as I have just
given them to you, together with your personal diagnosis and examination of the patient on October 22nd,
together with your personal know ledge and experience
in the field of medicine, what is your professional
opinion as to whether or not on June 22, 1940, Mrs.
Webb was or was not pregnant?" (Tr. 177)
5. The court erred in overruling appellants' objection to
the question asked of appellants' witness Dr. Skidmore on cross
examination as follows :
"Assuming that on the evening in question, on the
22nd of June, 1940, Mrs. Webb was struck a blow by
the fist of a man, and she was propelled violently to the
floor at the place she was standing, and was knocked
wholly unconscious for some considerable period of
time, that later she was revived and escorted to her
automobile, with help, and that she went home, and five
or six days thereafter she had nausea in the stomach;
she had severe backaches; the side of her face was swollen and bruised ; she suffered severe headaches, and five
or six days after this occurrence she suffered continuous
violent vaginal hemorrhages, accompanied by large
clots of blood, for ten or fourteen days thereafter:
Would that state of facts, Doctor, enable you to venture an opinion as to whether or not this hemorrhage,
these hemorrhages that she suffered were as a result
of the blows inflicted upon her?" (Tr. 206)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

o. '

~ed

13
6. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 3 reading as follows :
''The court instructs the jury that defendants' employee \Yas the best judge of what was necessary to
defend himself against the attack of plaintiff and of
the means to be used for his own proteotion. When
the defendants' employee was attacked he was obliged
to exercise his best judgment at that time as to what
he should do in his own defense and his judgment is
one which, if honestly and reasonably exercised, is controlling. It is absolutely controlling unless you find
that his exercise of it at the time and under the circumstances, was such an exercise as was unreasonable under
all the evidence in the case. So, if you find that from
the nature of the assault committed upon defendants'
employee by plaintiff he had a right to think he was
being attacked by a person it was necessary for him
to defend himself against, and in so acting his hand
came in contact with plaintiff, without thought on his
part that it might be a woman, then Jhe plaintiff cannot recover in this action." (Exception Tr. 251)
7. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested
Instruction No. 4 reading as follows :

"You are instructed that the defendants' employee
had a right to protect himself against ·an assault by
plaintiff. If you. find that plaintiff assaulted ·defendants'
employee in such a manner and under such conditions
as to naturally excite an ordinarily careful and prudent
man in the place of said emplo)liee under the same circumstances and conditions, then the said employee cannot he held to the greatest nicety in the calculation of
the amount of force which he should use; and even if
he did use more force than was necessary, still if under
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the circumstances he acted as an ordinarily careful and
prudent man under the influence of plaintiff's conduct,
as you find it to be, would have acted under the same
circumstances and conditions, then you should find in
favor of the defendants-'no cause of action.' " (Exception Tr. 251)
8. The court erred tn refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 5 reading as follows :
"You are instructed that these defendants have
the full right to determine the operation of the scenic
racer and that they, through their servants, having
determ·ined not to operate the east set of tracks or green
cars, then Bernard L. Bettilyon had no right to go on
that side of the racer platform. You are further instructed that having gone on the east side if you find
that his being there did in any way interfere with or
cause trouble to defendants' servants in their operation
of the racer that the servants of defendants had a lawful right to use such reasonable force-as was necessary,
after requesting Bernard L. Bettilyon to leave that part
of defendants' property, to remove him from the place
in question. You are also instructed that if in using
force to remove said Bernard L. B'ettilyon that he attempted to or did start to fight or hit the servant or
servants of defendants and as a result of such assault
or attempted assault the said Bernard L. Bettilyon was
later injured, and that thereafter this plaintiff's husband
voluntarily came into the fight and that later this plaintiff herself left a place of safety and slapped defendants'
employee in the face, as a result of which plaintiff was
struck by said employee, then plaintiff cannot recover
in this case and your verdict will be for the defendants,
and each of them, 'no cause of action.' " (Exception Tr.
251)
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9. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 6 reading as follows :
"If you find from· all the evidence that plaintiff
struck defendants' employee when said employee was
not expecting such an assault and said employee had
reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that it
was necessary to protect himself and in protecting himself he turned quickly and struck plaintiff but used no
more force or violence than to him honestly and reasonably appeared necessary to repel a threatening injury,
· then under such circumstances the defendants.' employee
did no wrong and plaintiff has no right to recover
damages in this case." (Exception Tr. 251)
10. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 7 reading as follows :
"You are instructed that Bernard L. Bettilyon had
no right to be on the east or green car side of the platform in question without the consent of defendants. So,
if you find that he, being on that side without right,
refused to leave the east side of said platform· when so
requested by defendants' servants and that said servants
then went to said Bernard L. Bettilyon at his dare and
invitation to induce him to vacate the east side of said
platform, and that as a result of the effort of defendants'
servants to induce him to leave that part of defendants'
premises the said Bernard L. Bettilyon, while said
servants were in the exercise of only such reasonable
force as was necessary to remove plaintiff, struck at
defendants' servant and started to fight as a result of
which he suffered some injury, then the plaintiff in this
case cannot justify herself in leaving a place of safety
and committing an assault upon the employee of these
defendants and therefore plaintiff cannot recover in
this case and your verdict must be for the defendants,
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and each of them, and against the plaintiff-'no cause
of action.' " (Exception Tr. 251-252)
11. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 8 reading as follows :
"You are instructed that the lawful owner or occupant ~f premises may rightfully restrict the use of
his premises to his business guests and this he may
do by word of mouth as well as by erecting signs or
barricades or by using other means of giving notice
of the restricted use. If a business guest refuses to quit
a restricted portion of the owner's or occupant's premises after verbal request so to do, and reasonable opportunity has been given him to depart, he thereby
becomes a trespasser and may be ejected by the use of
such reasonable force as is necessary under the circumstances. So, in this case, if you find the acts of which
the plaintiff complains arose out of the use of such
force on the part of the employees of the defendants or
an exercise on their part of the right to defend themselves against attack by Mr. Bettilyon, then plaintiff
cannot recover in this action." (Exception Tr. 252)
12. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested 'Instruction No. 9 reading as follows :
"You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence that when Bernard Lynch went into the
trouble going on at the place in question here the altercation was brought to a stop by his taking hold of Mr.
Bettilyon and attempting to get him away from the
troUJble and that Mr. Bettilyon then broke away from
him and charged at Jack Lampere, who at that time in
self-defense struck Mr. Bettilyon, that then Mr. Bettilyon was the aggressor; and if you further find that
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~Ir.

\\'ebb was still in the altercation along with Mr.
Bettilyon then I instruct you that plaintiff had no right
to leave a place of safety, go up to Mr. Lampere and
strike him, and that she cannot recover in this action
against these defendants." (Exception Tr. 252) ·

13. The court erred in refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 12 reading as follows :
"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at the
time of the alleged assault and battery she was pregnant and that as a result of said alleged assault and battery she suffered a m·iscarriage. The court instructs
you that there is no substantial evidence that plaintiff
was pregnant at the time of the alleged assault and
!battery and you are therefore instructed to disregard
this phase of the case in your deliberations." (Exception Tr. 252)
14. The court erred tn refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 13 reading as follows :

"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at the
time of the alleged assault and battery she was pregnant and that as a result of said alleged assault and battery she suffered a miscarriage. The court instructs
you that there is no substantial evidence that the miscarriage, if any, was caused by or contributed to by the
alleged assault and battery and you are therefore instructed to disregard this phase of the case 1n your
deliberations." (Exception Tr. 252)

15. The court erred in failing and refusing to instruct or
otherwise present to the jury the appellants' theory or theories
of their defense or defenses to the alleged cause of action sued
upon by plaintiff. (Exception Tr. 252)
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16. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No.
4 reading as fallows :
"The court instructs you, if you find from the
evidence that the plaintiff's admission to Saltair Beach
was paid, that she was a guest and had a right to remain
there as long as said resort remained open to the public
that evening." (Exception Tr. 246)

·:~(

17. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No.
5 reading as follows :
"The court instructs you if you find from the
evidence that the plaintiff was apprehensive that her
husband and brother, or either of them, were in danger
of bodily harm, and that she interceded in the affray in
order to try to protect either or both of them, that she
was justified in doing so. If you further find from
the evidence that as a result of her participation in the
affray she was. rendered unconscious by a blow from
one of the defendants' employees, the mere fact that
she participated in the affray would not bar her from
recovering damages from the defendants." (Exception Tr. 246)
18. The court erred in giving to the jury those parts of
Instruction No. 5 reading as follows :
"First. 'The court instructs you if you find from
the evidence that the plaintiff was apprehensive that
her husband and brother, or either of them, were in
danger of bodily harm, and that she interceded in the
affray in order to try to protect either or both of them,
that she was justified in doing so.' " (Exception Tr.
253)
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"Second. 'If you further find from the evidence
that as a result of her participation in the affray she
was rendered unconscious by a blow from one of the
defendants' employees, the mere fact that she participated in the affray would not bar her from recovering
damages from the defendants.'" (Exception Tr. 254)
19. The court erred in giving to the jury
6 reading as follows :

~Instruction

No.

''A person is justified in using sufficient force to
protect members of his or her family provided the
apparent danger is such as to induce one exercising a
reasonable and proper judgment to interfere to prevent
a consummation of the injury." (Tr. 246)
20. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No.
7 reading as follows :
"The court instructs you that if you believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff was pregnant at the time
she was rendered unconscious by the blow delivered by
one of the defendants' employees, and as a result of
said blow and being knocked to the floor she suffered a
miscarriage and thereby the loss of her unborn child,
you may award her money damages for the loss of said
urrborn child." (Tr. 246-247)
21. The court erred in giving to the jury those parts of
Instruction No. 7 reading as follows :
"First. 'The court instructs you that if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was pregnant
at the time she was rendered unconscious by the blow
delivered hy one of the defendants' employees.' (Exception Tr. 254)
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"Second. 'And as a result of said blow and being
knocked to the floor she suffered a miscarriage and
thereby the loss of her unborn child, you may award her
money damages for the loss of said unborn child.'"
(Exception Tr. 254)
22. The court erred in giving to the jury Instruction No..
10 reading as follows :
"The court instructs you, members of the jury,
that if you find the issues in this case in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, you may find for the
plaintiff such a sum as will compensate her for the
following damages, not to exceed $5,000.00:
1. The actual personal injuries which she suffered;
2. The consequent pain and suffering which she
suffered as a result of her physical injuries;
3. Money damages for the loss of her unborn child
as a result of said miscarriage.
In addition to the amount named· above, you may
also assess such damages as will compensate for the
loss or injury to her clothing, not to exceed the sum
of $75.00." (Tr. 247-248)
23. The court erred in giving to the jury those parts of
Instruction No. 10 reading as follows :
"First. 'The actual personal injuries which she
suffered.' " (Exception Tr. 254)
"Second. The consequent pain and suffering
which she suffered as a result of her physical injuries."
(Exception Tr. 254)
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"Third. 'Money damages for the loss of her unborn child as a result of said miscarriage.' " ( Exception Tr. 255)
··Fourth. 'In addition to the amount named above,
you may .also assess such damages as will compensate
for the loss or injury to her clothing, not to exceed the
sum of $22.50,' and" ((Exception Tr. 255)
"'Fifth. 'The total amount of all damages which ·
you may find for the plaintiff cannot exceed the sum
of $5022.50.' .. (Exception Tr. 255)
24. The court erred in receiving the verdict and entering judgment thereon in that the verdict is excessive and
against the law.
25. The court erred in denying appellants' motion for a
new trial, which motion was based upon the grounds recited in
the Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial (Tr. 265)
which grounds are as follows :

"1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, abuse of discretion by the court
which prevented the defendants from having a fair
trial.
"2. Misconduct of the jury.
"3. Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
"4. Excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
"5. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or decision, and that it is against the law.
"6. Error in law occurring at .the trial and excepted to by the defendants.
"7. Newly discovered evidence material for the
defendants which it could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial."
(Exception Tr. 265)
,
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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS' THEORY
In presenting appellants' defense in this case counsel filed
with the court various requests which counsel conceived of as
stating the law applicable to appellants' theory of the issues in
controversy. The court did not instruct the jury as requested
by appellants and failed wholly to give to the jury any instructions that did present appellants' theory of the case.
It was and now is appellants' theory of this case, which
is sustained by evidence at every point, that:
The appellee and her party, at the time of the altercation
or subsequent thereto, never had offered to pay or paid therequired fee for a ride on the racer; that if they had ever intended
to ride they had abandoned the idea as expressed by them in
saying that they would spend their money at some other concession; (Tr. 78) that the fact was that Mr. Bettilyon, brother
of appellee, was the leader of the party and that following his
approximately four hours at the highball convention at the
Newhouse Hotel (Tr. 72-73) that he was at Saltair to do foolish and uncalled for things for the amusement of his party;
that in going down on the east side, he was at a point where
he had no right to be, therefore, appellants' boys after several
times inviting him to leave were fully within their rights in
going over to him· to try and get him around where he would
not cause them trouble in the operation of the racer; that for
him to be where he was created a constant .hazard to the safety
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of the racer operation, because it diverted the attention of the
boys from their work; that when they invited him to leave and
he did not, he became a trespasser and was subject to removal ;
that the evidence sho\ved that when Earl Cochran went over
at Bettilyon' s invitation to assist him to a point of safety and
under appellee's testimony was using no more force than necessary (Tr. 146-7) and under appellants' evidence using no force
at all, Bettilyon "swung at him"; (Tr. 80) and thereby became
the aggressor in the altercation that followed; that under appellants' evidence and particularly "Slim" Lynch's testimony
(Tr. 148) which is that of a disinterested witness, with Mr.
Webb. appellee's husband, coming in, the entry of Jack Lampere into the affray was justified; that when "Slim" came in
and took hold of Mr. Bettilyon and started removing him that
the entire matter had come to a settlement (Tr. 148) and that
when Mr. Bettilyon broke loose and started to fight anew,
again, he was the aggressor and wholly responsible for what
happened; that when Mr. Bettilyon was knocked down the
entire brawl was again at a point of rest; that the appellee in
stepping out from a place of safety and striking Jack Lampere
was in no better position than was Mr. Bettilyon or her husband
and further that there was no excuse for her as a reasonably
prudent person stepping out and striking Jack as she did at
the time she did.
We maintain further that the evidence as to appellee's
pregnancy and alleged miscarriage was not sufficient, but if it
were admitted, for the sake of argument, then damages are so
excessive as to show prejudice on the part of the jury.
In considering the appellants' assignments of error counsel
will group them under just as few main heads as practicable.
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II.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR HAVING TO DO
WITH PREGNANCY AND MISCARRIAGE
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 AND· 2
In the first Assignment of Error the appellants contend
that the court erred in overruling appellants' objection to and
permitting appellee, as a witness in her own behalf, to answer
the following question on direct examination:
"Can you tell the court and jury whether or not
you were pregnant on the evening of June 22, 1940 ?'"
(Tr. 127)
Appellants' counsel in making his objection to the question
stated that the witness. was not shown to be qualified to make
a conclusion of that kind and the trial court in overruling the
objection said:
"That would depend. After about thirty days
they may know whether they are pregnant or not." (Tr.
127)
In answer to the question appellee stated that she had
missed her monthly period which was about two weeks prior
to June 22nd. Appellants' counsel then renewed his objection
and moved to strike both the question and ans.wer and the court
denied the mot~on. (Tr. 128) This left the jury to infer that
the court was of the opinion that the appellee was pregnant.
The appellee was a lay witness and as such was not competent to testify as to whether she was pregnant at the time
of the alleged assault and battery. The rule is well settled that
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where one's physical condition is of such a character as to require skilled and professional men to determine the same, the
question is one of science and must necessarily be determined
by the testimony of skilled professional persons. In the case
of Oklaho1na H osp£tal "L'. BroUJn} (Okla.), 208 Pac. 787, the
court in its opinion said:
''It is the settled rule that where the injuries complained of are of such a character as to require skilled
and professional men to determine the cause and extent
thereof the question is one of science and must necessarily be determined by the testimony of skilled professional persons."
In Skidmore v. Oklahoma Hospital) (Okla.) 278 Pac.
334, the court in its opinion said:
"It is contended by defendant that the evidence is
wholly insufficient to establish that the distention of the
bladder caused the stitches to tear and that the tearing
of the stitches caused the bladder to fall; that there is
no expert testimony supporting this theory of plaintiff's
case.
"Two physicians testified on behalf of plaintiffthe physician who performed the operation and another.
Both physicians testified that in their opinion the distention of the bladder did not cause the stitches to tear,
and that the tearing of the stitches was not the cause of
the falling of the bladder, but that the same was occasioned by natural absorption of the stitches.
"W·e think, in order to sustain this theory of her
case, it was necessary that she establish the same by
expert testimony. In the case of St. L. & S. F. Ry. v.
Criner, 41 Okl. 256, 137 P. 705, it is said: (Where the
injuries are of such character as to require skilled and
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professional men to determine the cause and extent
thereof., the question is one of science, and must necessarily be determined by the testimony of skilled professional persons.,' See, also, A., T. & S. F. Ry. v. Melson, 40 Okl. 1, 134 P. 388, Ann. Cas. 191SD, 760.
''The rule announced in these cases is well established, and, if this were the only element of damages
sought to be recovered, the judgment of the trial court
would be correct.''

In St. Louis Mining & Smelting Company, et al. v. State
Industrial Commission, (Okla.) 241 Pac. 170, the court said
and held:
"We need not deal at length with the first part of
the question, for in our judgment the latter part is determinative in this case; that is, ·was the 'accident' the
cause of the disability? As to the effects of the gas
upon his person, the claimant was the only one who
testified in his behalf, and in brief his testimony, in
substance, was :
"'I was gassed. I remained at work .with slight
ill effects, two days thereafter, and am now disabled.'
uNo one skilled in scientific kno7pledge was brought
who said that the event of claimant being slightly gassed
caused his disability. On the other hand, the undisputed testimony in the record from the only witness
qualified to testify concerning the causes and effects of
internal diseases such as suff·ered by claimant was, in
substance, that the disability of claimant was caused
by anthracosis, and solely from such occcupational disease." * * *
"We are of the opinion, from a .careful examination of the record, that the claimant failed to produce
any competent evidence to form a basis for the finding
by the commission that the 'accident,' as claimed, resulted in the disability."
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~-\SSIGNMENTS

OF ERROR NOS. 13 AND 14

The appellee in her amended complaint alleged that at
the time of the assault and battery first "she was pregnant"
and second that
"as a result of the injuries inflicted upon her by
said malicious assault and battery that approximately
six days thereafter she suffered a miscarriage thereby
losing her unborn child. * * *." (Tr. 13-D)
The appellee failed to produce evidence which would justify either of these questions being submitted to the jury. The
appellants urgently insist that the court erred in refusing to
give their requested instruction number 12 which reads as
follows:
"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at
the time of the alleged assault and battery she was
pregnant and that as a result of said alleged assault and
battery she suffered a miscarriage. The court instructs
you that there is no substantial evidencec that plaintiff
was pregnant at the time of the alleged assault and
battery and you are therefore instructed to disregard
this phase of the case in your deliberations." (Exception Tr. 252)
The only evidence tending in any way to show that appellee
was pregnant at the time of the alleged assault and battery is
found in appellee's own testimony and in the testimony of
Doctor Giesy and Doctor Skidmore. The appellee's testimony
which was made in response to a question asking whether she
was pregnant on the evening of June 22nd was that she had
missed her monthly period a little over two weeks prior to that
time. This testimony, in view of the testimony of Doctor
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Giesy, gives very little strength to appellee's. contention as Doctor Giesy on cross examination stated that it is not unusual for
a woman to miss her period without being pregnant and that
lots of women have irregular menstrual periods..
The appellee further stated that
"Six days after this happened I started to hemorrhage and I hemorrhaged continuously up to the first
of January of this year." (Tr. 129)
H·ere again the appellee's testimony adds. little to her contention as her own witness, Doctor Giesy, on cross examination stated that you could not definitely determine the absolute
cause of the condition which he found in Mrs. Webb and that
it is almost impossible for any person to give a listing of the
things that may ,cause a displacement of the uterus because
there are so many. (Tr. 187, 191)
Doctor Giesy upon being asked a hypothetical question
stated, that in his opinion appellee was pregnant on June 22nd.
(Tr. 179) However, on cross examination Doctor Giesy's
testimony on this point was weakened considerably as. it appeared that his opinion was based entirely upon probabilities
and conjecture and that the conditions which he found gave
rise merely to a probability of pregnancy. (Tr. 189-190)
The jury in this. case should not have been permitted to
consider and decide upon a fact where the only ·evidence supporting such fact was based upon mere probability and conjecture.
The court erred further in refusing to give defendants'
requested instruction number 16 reading as follows:
"The plaintiff in this action has alleged that at
the time of the alleged assault and battery she was
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pregnant and that as a result of said alleged assault
and battery she suffered a miscarriage. The court instructs you that there is no substantial evidence that
the miscarriage, if any, was caused by or contributed to
by the alleged assault and battery and you are therefore
instructed to disregard this phase of the case in your
deliberations.~, (Exception Tr. 252)
The appellee alleged and had the burden of proving that
the alleged miscarriage was suffered uas a result of the injuries
inflicted upon her by said malicious assault and battery." Evidence which would justify the court in submitting this question
to the jury is entirely lacking.
The appellee's only attempt to connect the alleged assault
and battery up with the fact that six days after she started to
hemorrhage and suffered a miscarriage was in the hypothetical
questions put to Doctor Giesy, (Tr. 177 to 180) and Doctor
Skidmore (Tr. 206 to 209). The answers given by each of
the doctors are that a blow sufficiently violent to propel appellee
to the floor would be sufficient to cause a miscarriage. But
this fact becomes merely a probability as the doctors thereafter
state that numerous things may cause the conditions from
which appellee complains.
With the alleged assault and battery being only one of
the many things which could cause the conditions complained
of by appellee, the jury was left entirely . to speculate and
conjecture as to the cause of these conditions. If there had been
sufficient evidence to establish the appellee's pregnancy without
it being based upon mere possibilities, ;conjecture and speculation, the evidence that there was a miscarriage that was caused
by the assault and battery is much too speculative to justify the
question being submitted to the jury.
In Jones et al. v. Pierce et al.) (Louisiana 1935) 162 So.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
21 5, action was brought to recover damages arising out of an
automobile accident. Plaintiff contends that she was four or
five months .pregnant and that as a result of the accident the
foetus of an unborn child was killed, rendering necessary its
removal by surgeons. The trial court dismissed the suit and
made the following statement:

" '* * * I am not in the slightest degree convinced
that the slight accident which I have described had
anything to do with this abortion. At the very best
it is a mere possibility and in a matter of serious import
to myself I would not act on it, as I do not believe that
this accident had anything to do with the abortion.'"
In affirming the trial court's decision the appellate court
said and held :
"The record shows that Mrs. Jones, prior to the
accident, was a normal, healthy woman, and that she,
on the night of the accident, had been pregnant for
about four or five months. She was seated on the front
sea:t of her husband's car when, in its course across
St. Charles avenue, it was brought to a stop to permit
a street car to pass ahead of it. A few feet of the
rear portion of the car extended into the roadway of
St. ~Charles avenue, and while it was in this position
the Pierce car approached. Pierce was. unable tn entirely stop it or to completely avoid striking the rear
of the Jones car. The result was a blow which pushed
the Jones car for~ard about one foot, and which
swerved it sidewise about three feet. Mrs. Jones received no external injuries, bruises, or abrasions, and
there was nothing to indicate to her, or to any one else,
that she had been in any way injured, except that she
stated that 'my stomach kept quivering.' Wheri asked
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whether the impact was a 'terrible blow,' she said, 'No
- I don't think it was.' She herself also testified that
it did not physically injure her in any way. She returned to her home and during that night gave no
indication whatever of having been injured. On the
next day she reported for her work as a comptometer
operator, and, according to her testimony, '·worked that
night until 8 :30,' and even then evidently felt perfectly
well, because she did not go from her place of employment to her home, but went to Loyola University to
wait until her husband, who was a student there, could
complete his studies at the night school. She then went
to her home and retired, still without any premonition
or indication of internal injuries or disorders, and she
slept until about midnight, when she was awakened by
the fact that she 'was losing a lot of blood.' She went
at once to a hospital, and there the physician in charge
was successful in stanching the flow·. On the next
morning she returned to her home, and, upon calling at
the office of her own physician, was examined by him,
with the result that he found one of the cords protrud.;.
ing in the vagina, and concluded from this that she
had 'had an abortion'; that the foetus was dead, and
that she should 'have the uterus cleaned out at the hospital.'
''It will be noted that, except for very slight nervous shock at the time of the accident, no ·physical
injury was sustained, no labor pains commenced, and
no symptoms of an impending miscarriage manifested
themselves, and that it was not until about thirty hours
after the collision that she suffered to any appreciable
extent. In the meantime, she went about all her duties
without pain and continued at her work for a full day
and for a part of the next night. It is unbelievable
that, had the umbilical cord been severed at the time of
the accident, there would have been no immediate evidence of that fact. This cord supplies to the foetus
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the blood and later the nourishment necessary for its
development and growth, and its severance would, unquestionably, have produced immediate hemorrhage,
pain, and suffering." * * *
"* * * There is no doubt that there are many other
possible causes for misfortune such as Mrs. Jones sustained. One .doctor testified to these other possible
ca;uses. We cannot conclude that the district judge was
in error in deciding that the proof does not show with
sufficient certainty that the cause was the accident complained of."
In Edenfield, et al. v. Wheless, et al., (:Louisiana, 1934)
151 So. 659, action was brought to recover damages alleged to
have been caused by an automobile accident. Mrs. Edenfield
at the time of the accident was four and one-half months pregnant. The accident occurred on July 25, 1932, and on July
28, 1932, labor pains came on and a Ccesarean operation was
performed. The question for determination was whether the
condition of Mrs. Edenfield was caused from the accident or
from a kidney condition which existed prior to the accident.
In affirming a judgrnent of the lower court the appellate court
said and held :

" * * * He

(Dr. Dickson) was asked if a blow
could possibly have caused the trouble suffered by Mrs.
Edenfield, and he replied, 'Yes, possibly.' He was then
asked if it was a probability in this case, and replied:
'Well, I do not know. I did not take that into consideration. T did not make a cystoscopic examination.'
"We have studied with care the testimony of Dr.
Stamper, who treated Mrs. Edenfield for two and onehalf years, to find where he gives as his opinion that the
trouble with Mrs. Edenfield after the accident was due
to the injuries received in the accident, and we have
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failed to find it. Each of these reputable physicians
and surgeons treated her before and after the accident.
Each performed an operation on her, and no doubt
would be inclined to be as favorable to her cause as
possible, an.d if they are not wiling to venture a.n
opinion that the slight in.ju.ry received by her was the
cause of her trouble thereafter, we think the court would
have to go a long 7.CJaY to do so. No doubt it is possible
that the injury could have caused the trouble, but we
cannot decide cases on possibilities alone. The lower
court held that the condition of Mrs. Edenfield after
the accident was not caused by the accident and slight
injury received there, and we find no manifest error
in its holding. It rejected the claim of Mr. Edenfield
and allowed to Mrs. Edenfield damages in the sum of
$100, for immediate shock on the date of the accident,
and rejected all other demands.
"There is no manifest error in the judgment, and
it is affirmed."
In Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Garmon_, (Kentucky 1930), 26 S. W. (2d) 20, appellee obtained a judgment
against appellant for $2,075 for injuries which she claimed she
received while riding on a bus operated by appellant. In its
OJ;)inion the court said and held:
"A more serious question is presented, however,
by another point urged against the instructions, but not
pressed with the same vigor as the point just ·disposed
of. It is insisted that the miscarriage was not shown
to have been the direct result of the collision. We
cannot agree with that contention. The evidence was
sufficient to authorize the jury to determine that it
resulted from the injury received because of the collision, and that the injury was the direct cause of the miscarriage. The evidence presented a further question
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of damages which went into the realms of speculation
and was too remote to be considered as the direct result of the injury. Appellee claims that the miscarriage
resulted in irijuries and suffering that may be attributed
to the miscarriage itself and not to the injury. The
·evidence does not present facts sufficient to enable a
jury to determine that the continued suffering and injuries resulting from the miscarriage were caused by
the collision. These may have been occasioned by
reason of other conditions having rto connection with
the collision. The physical condition of appellee, the
treatment she received by the physicians at the time
of the miscarriage, and care and attention received by
her after the event, may have been the. cause of the
continued disorders about which she complains. The
evidence is sufficient to show that she suffered between
the time of the accident and until the time of her miscarriage, and, of course, the miscarriage resulted in
certain natural suffering which rna y be traced directly
to the collision. But the evidence was not such as to
show that the lingering ailments and disorders which
continued on down to the trial were the direct rest·tlts
of the collision. Dr. Johnson, who testified for appellee, stated that certain pains on the side and certain
disorders attending the natural functions of appellee
after the miscarriage were probably attributable to an
infection following the miscarriage. This evidence was
objected to and overruled and proper exceptions were
reserved. There was evidence along this same line given
by the doctor. He testified that an operation would
probably be necessary for the removal of some of the
genital organs. This evidence allowed the jury to find
for appellee for suffering occasioned by the miscarriage,
when the disorders were .probably caused, according to
the doctor, by an infection following the miscarriage.
This evidence should not have been admitted. It is
not shown that her suffering growing out of the infecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion was the direct result of the collision. Instead of
an instruction, as contended for by appellant, limiting
the recovery to the injuries other than those not directly connected with the collision, the .court should
have sustained objections to the evidence relating to
these sufferings.
The instructions, therefore, were
proper, but incompetent evidence was admitted, and
that is one of the grounds for a new trial."
In Ford v. Nicolet al. (Michigan 1933), 246 N. W. 130,
the court said and held :
"The testimony did not disclose evidentiary facts.
The expert had but a theory that plaintiff was sterile
because she did not become pregnant; that she did not
become pregnant because of lack of ovulation; that
lack of ovulation was because of shock to her nervous
system. Probative evidence must be something more
tangible than a mere pyramiding of theories. The 'Witness gave no satisfactory date upon which to base his
conjectures. The sterility here alleged was too remote
and speculative, considering the nature of the injuries, to
warrant the verdict rendered. Incapacity to bear children, except occasioned by direct injury to, or disease
of, sexual organs or reproductive functions, is difficult
to prove, but cannot be permitted to rest upon conjecture of such inability and speculation as to the cause
of such conjectured inability. We need make no quotations from the expert evidence in contradiction of the
postulates of the expert called by plaintiff. The evidence
must show sterility in fact and occasioned by direct
bodily injuries or the proximate result thereof."
In Symington v. Graham (Maryland 1933) 169 A. 316
plaintiff sued to recover damages which she claimed resulted
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from a collision occurring February 12, 1932. The appellate
court in reversing the judgment for the plaintiff said and held:
"The impact of the collision threw the plaintiff
from the front seat so that her face struck the windshield, and she was thrust forward with her knees
jammed fast underneath the cowl board of the automobile. She was momentarily stunned, and her nose
bled freely from the force of the blow of the windshield,
but she got out of the automobile, and assisted her
husband with the defendant, who was unconscious and
badly injured. After the defendant had been carried
away to a nearby store, the plaintiff felt nauseated and
sick and w!alked to a neighboring farm house where
she stayed until the defendant was removed in an ambulance when the plaintiff went to the store where the doctor examined her to see if there were any bones broken in
her nose. After this examination, the plaintiff was put
in an automobile and sent home in a nervous condition.
Her nose became very much swollen and black to the
eyes, and she became sore, stiff, and bruised, but had
no pain until the evening of the day following the
casualty, when pain, which was more pronounced on
the right side of the abdomen, began. She stated that
the manner in which her knees had struck the automobile had caused the 'jar and the pain through my
(her) stomach.' She had bruises on both legs which
were sore, and remained for four weeks before they
were entirely gone. The plaintiff described these abdominal pains as 'intense stomach pains' which continued for a period of three or four weeks. She was then
able to proceed with her household duties.
"While the severe stomach pains ceased at the end
of three or four weeks after the injury, she experienced
slight similar pains until the end of two months after
the accident. After this period, the pains were succeeded by an unusual soreness and drawing sensation
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in the left side which continued until the day she went
to the hospital on July 3. The plaintiff thus described
the discomfort : 'The burden seemed too low, and just
uncomfortable; just a pulling and drawing sensation
day and night.~ .. * * *
•(Jn order to prevent imposition it is necessary to
keep constantly and firmly in view the elementary rule
that before a plaintiff cau recover it is necessary for
hinz to sho7.t' a damage naturally and reasonably arising
from the negligent act. The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the particular consequence for which
a pecuniary finding is sought is the direct result of a
wrongful act or omission by the defendant. The plaintiff fails in this burden, although he proves the negligence and the injury, unless he show that the particular injury would in ordinary course flow from the
negligence. Abend v. Sieber, 161 Md. 649, 158 A.
63; Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 40 A. 1067, 41 L. R.
A. 478; Beven on Negligence (4th Ed.) vol. 1, pp.
67, 85.
"The plaintiff has failed in this case to meet this
burden of proof. The testimony of the doctor, whom
she called, is clearly to the effect that there is no natural
and reasonable connection between the accident of February 12, and the plaintiff's illness and operation of
July 3. Nor is this connection shown by any other testimony on the record. Conjecture~ speculation~ or mere
possibility~ must not usurp the place of proof of the
essential facts in issue if the trial of facts is to remain
a rational and just procedure. For the error in refusing
the motion to strike out the testimony with reference
to the pain, suffering, and distress of the plaintiff attributable to her illness and its resulting operation, and
in declining to grant the defendant~s prayers excluding
these matters from the consideration of the jury in estimating the amount of damages sustained~ the judgment
must be reversed.~~
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR BASED ON ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINAT,ION
ASSIGNMENT OF ·ERROR NO. 3
In the third Assignment of Error the appellants insist
the court erred in permitting counsel ·for appellee to ask Earl
C·ochran, appellants' witness, on cross-examination over. our
objection this ques'tion:
"Now, you have described those duties you have
in connection with the collection of fares. Is acting
as a bouncer for the ejection or eviction of people that
you think should be evicted, also a part of your duties t'
(Tr. 160)
The first sentence of the question, "Now, you have described
those duties you have in connection with the collection of fares.''
means nothing because it is merely a statement by counsel of
what the witness had finished doing. It does emphasize, how. ever, that counsel had in mind to unfairly discredit the witness
before the jury when he next said
"Is acting as a bouncer for the. ejection or eviction
of people that you think should be evicted also a part
of Y?Ur duties?"
This statement, first, is an open attempt on the part of
counsel to embarrass the witness before the jury in that counsel
injects into the picture a rough situation such as a bar-room
or the like, where the "bouncer" is a required part of the
equipment.
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Second, it assumes that appellants maintained such a place
and that a "bouncer" was necessary and that this boy was of
such a character, that he would act as a bouncer.
Third, the statement assumes that as such "bouncer" he
could eject or evict people whom he thought ought to be 'thrown
out regardless of who they were or what they were doing.
There was no evidence in the record which would warrant
any inference that appellants employed anyone to act as bouncers
in and about the giant racer, and particularly that this witness
was employed for any such purpose. Neither is there anything
in the record that the appellants employed anyone to eject or
evict people that they "think should be evicted," or that this
particular witness was so employed. The record shows upon
its face that the sole and only reason for asking this question
was to prejudice the mind of the jury against the appellants.
That it is error for counsel on cross-eXiamination to ask
questions on such entirely· collateral issues in an attempt to
humiliate the witness and to assume facts such as were assumed
here is clearly established by the following cases :

Johnson vs. Richards, ('Idaho) 294 Pac. 507, where the
court gave:
"The court properly sustained an objection to the
following question asked respondent on cross-examination: 'Isn't it a fact that by reason of the financial condition of your husband and the troubles over your extravagances, that suits were instituted against him
here?' The question assumed there was trouble over
rrespondent's extravagances, as to which there was no
evidence. It was .duplicitous and not proper cross-examination. For like reasons the court did not err in
sustaining objections to the following question: 'At
that time and prior thereto, you had serious quarrels
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covering a long period of time, by reason of and on
account of your attempting to poison him, didn't you?' "

Annarina vs.. Boland, (Md.) 111 Atl. 84:
"The fifth exception relates to the action of the
court in refusing to permit the same witness to be asked
on cross-examination if he did not live at his mother's
home with the woman he married, before he married
her. Such testimony was entirely collateral to any
issue in the case and did not bear in any way on the
credibility of the witness and its only possible purpose
was to degrade and humiliate him, and for that purpose
it was inadmissible. Avery v. State, 121 Md. 236, 88
Atl. 148, and the question was properly refused. The
same witness was later asked if his father had not sworn
out a peace warrant against his mother. The court very
properly refused to permit this question, and its ruling
is the· subject of the sixth exception. Even if the fact
sought to be proved were relevant, that was not the
way in which to prove it."

Essex vs. Millikan, et

al~

(Ind.) 164 N. E. 284:

"Appellees' objection to this question was sustained. This. ruling is claimed to be reversible error.
The question assumes facts not covered b~ the direct
testimony of the witness, but in conflict with the direct
and positive testimony of the witness. The question
assumes a copy of the lease in question had once been
in the possession of Williams, and that, through some
manner, had thereafter gotten into the possession of the
witness. There is no claim that Exhibit 1 was ever in
the possession of Williams or that appellant ever parted
with its possession. As was said in Pennsylvania Co.
v. Newm.eyer, 129 Ind. 401, 28 N. E. 860, quoting
from Starkie. on Evidence: 'Although upon cross-exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amination a counsel may put leading questions, those
questions must not assume facts to have been proved
which have not been proved, or tha't particular answers
have been given contrary to the facts.' There was no
reversible error in the action of the court in sustaining
the objection.''
See also the rule as stated in the following cases :

v.

Cristofaro Brenfleck, 184 A. (N. J.) 619, point ( 5);
Maloney v. Carey, 9 A. (2d) (N. J.) 791, point (3);
Bradburn Motors Co. v. Moverman, (R.I.) 7 A. (2d)
207, point ( 5).
It is also error to assume in a question as it is here assumed, thaf there was some duty upon the appellants which
did not exist either as a matter of law or as shown by the facts.

Wise v. Schneider, (Ala.) 88 So. 662:
"Where a statute or ordinance has prescribed the
duties of persons who are driving vehicles over highways, with respect to the safety of other vehicles or
persons, it is proper for the trial judge to instruct the
jury as to the legal duties thus imposed. But it was
not proper to ask defendants' witness Newsome, who
was in the car, but not driving it, 'Don't you know, as
a driver of a car, that it is your duty to keep to the
right when turning a corner,' and 'to keep close to the
right when turning a corner?' The question assumes
the existence of a duty not prescribed by any statute,
nor hy any municipal ordinance of Cullman, so far
as appears, and it was not within the legitimate range
of a general cross-examination of the witness."
From the foregoing and from the size of the verdict in
this case it is certain that the court erred in overruling our
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objection to the question first hereinabove set out and that the
error warrants a reversal of this judgment.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 4 AND 5
Appellants have assigned as errors number 4 and number
5 the court's over-ruling of their objections to the hypothetical
questions propounded to appellee's witness, Doctor Giesy, and
appellants' witness, Doctor Skidmore. Appellants assign these
errors on the same grounds that were argued at the time the
questions were asked, namely, that the questions contain statements of fact which were not supported by the evidence and
that the facts were colored and exaggerated to the extent that
they were misleading. The courts have held that questions
propounded in such a manner should be excluded.
The rule is clearly stated in Wingfield v. McClintock, et al.,
(Kan.) 116 Pac. 488, at page 489, as follows:
"Each party had a right to propound hypothetical
questions upon his own theory of what the evidence
tended to prove, provided such questions contained no
1naterial exaggeration or perversion of facts assumed.
It is said in Commercial Travelers v. Barnes, 75 Kan.
720, 90 Pac. 293: 'Hypothetical questions put to expert witnesses should be based upon such facts only as
the evidence tends to prove, and if, as to any material
hypothesis, such question is without the support of evidence, it should be excluded. It may not be required
that the question be based upon conceded facts, nor
that it embrace all the facts of which there is evidence,;
neither is technical accuracy required in the framing of
the question, but no material exaggeration or perversio•
of facts assumed is permissible."
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Certainly it was an exaggeration of the evidence when
appellee's counsel stated in propounding the hypothetical questions that "she was struck a blow of sufficient force to cause her
to sit down z,;olently * * * " (Tr. 177), and, "she was propelled
violently to the floor at the place she was standing." (Tr. 206)
The trial judge in allowing the questions to stand in the
face of defendants' objections would give the jury the impression that he believed the evidence to be as stated in the
questions.

IV
ASSIGNl\IENTS OF ERROR BASED UPON REFUSAL
TO GIVE APPELLANTS' REQUES·TED
INSTRUCTIONS
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6
From the evidence of the witnesses for appellants it -is
clear that Jack Lampere was just standing at the time the
plaintiff came up from behind and struck him full in the face.
Under such evidence the appellants were entitled to an instruction setting out their rights under such conditions.
Request Number 3 did that very thing, but it, nor nothing
like it) was given to the jury.
The request set out under Assignment Number 6 reads
as follows:
"The court instructs the jury that defendants'
employee was the best judge of what was necessary to
defend himself against the attack of plaintiff and of
the means to be used for his own protection. When the
defendants' employee was attacked he was obliged to
exercise his best judgment at that time as to what he
should do in his own defense and his judgment is one
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which, if honestly and reasonably exercised, is controlling. It is absolutely controlling unless you find
that his exercise of it at the time and under t}le circumstances, was such an exercise as was unreasonable under
all the evidence in the case. So, if you find that from
the nature of the assault committed upon defendants'
employee by plaintiff he had a right to think he was
being attacked by a person it was necessary for him to
defend himself against, and in so acting his hand came
in contact with plaintiff, without thought on his part
that it might be a woman, then the plaintiff cannot
recover in this action."
This request was approved as an instruction in the case
of Kent v. Cole (Mich.) 48 N. W. 168, and is given as a pattern
in 3 ·Re!d's B:ranson Instructions to Juries 96.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7
The appellants, on their theory of what happened when
the appellee struck Jack Lampere, requested the court to instruct the jury as set out in Request No. 4. The court refused
and did not cover the point invoked by any instruction given.
The request reads :
"You are instructed that the defendants' employee
had a right to protect himself against an assault by
plaintiff. If you find that plaintiff assaulted defendants'
employee in such a manner and under such conditions
as to naturally excite an ordinarily careful and prudent
man in the pla:ce of said employee under the same circumstances and conditions, then the said employee cannot be held to the greatest nicety in the calculation of
the amount of force which he should use; and even if
he did use more force than was necessary, still if under
the circumstances he acted as an ordinarily careful and
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prudent man under the influence of plaintiff's conduct,
as you find it to be, would have acted under the same
circumstances and conditions, then you should find in
favor of the defendants-'no cause of action.' "
That the law set out in this request is correct and that
appellants were entitled to such instruction see
3 Reid's Branson, 98 and 99, under paragraph 8;
Swinney ·v. Wright (Ga.) 132 S. E. 228-9;
In the case of Armuleuis v. Koblitz (Ohio) 150 N.
620, the court said :

E~

''The charge was not a model in wording, but, in
substance, it was to the effect that, if the evidence
showed, and the jury believed, that the plaintiff, Koblitz, came to the home of the defendant Joseph Armuleuis and while there caused a disturbance, and that
the defendant Joseph Armuleuis repeatedly requested
Koblitz to leave his home, and Koblitz repeatedly refused to go, and continued to conduct himself in the
same disturbing manner, the defendant was justified in
using such force as was necessary to eject the plaintiff
from his house, and the law does not closely, nor nicely,
measure the force which the defendant used to effect
that purpose. This request to charge was refused. This
constituted reversible error. Chesrown v. Bevier, 101
Ohio St. 282, 128 N. E. 94; p·ayne, Direc'tor General,
v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N. E. 85.
"Th~ judgm.ent must therefore be reversed."
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 9
Appellants' third attempt to get the court to give some
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instruction on their theory of this particular phase of the case
is represented by its Request No. 6 reading:
If you find from all the evidence that plaintiff
struck defendants' employee when said employee was
not expecting such an assault and said employee had
reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that· it
was necessary to pro'tect himself and in protecting himself he turned quickly and struck plaintiff but used no
more force or violence than to him honestly and reasonably appeared necessary to repel a threatening injury,
'then under such cir.cumstances the defendants' employee did no wrong and plaintiff has no right to recover
damages in this case.''
Certainly the foregoing request is closely tied in to the evidence and sufficiently states the law covering the facts in evidence.
The rule of law set out in headnote No. 2 of Chesrown
v. Bevier (Ohio) 128 N. E. 94 clearly shows that error was
committed by the court in not instructing on the phases of the
case covered by the three requests last hereinabove set out.
The statement in the case last above set out is this:
"Upon a written request to charge before argument, if the request correctly states the law and is pertinent to one or more of the issues of the case and the
same subject has not been covered by other charges
:given before argument, it is error to refuse to give
such charge before argument, even though the language
of the charge is not the exact language the court would
have selected."

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 8
The evidence is clear that the appellants were the owners

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r

47
of and operated the giant racer. They therefore had the
right to determine the manner in which the cars should be operated and had at the time in question, through their servants,
elected not to operate the east side of the tracks or the green cars.
Appellants' evidence shows that their employees had several
times requested Bettilyon to leave the east platform and go over
to the west side. (Tr. 234-5) If Bettilyon refused to leave the
east platform after being requested to do so by appellants'
employees. then he became a 'trespasser and the employees had
the right to use such reasonable force as. was necessary to remove him from the premises. Very substantial evidence shows
that Mr. Bettilyon refused to leave the east platform. The
evidence further shows that his attitude was one of resistance
and that at the very first he was the aggressor and in spite of
the effort of the appellants' employee he "swung" at him and
the fight was on. (Tr. 80-81) The same attitude exhibited by
Mr. Bettilyon was exhibited by Mr. Webb even after the entire
affair was over. He says he went out to organize to go back
for more. ( Tr. 46)
If Bettilyon were a trespasser, or if he were the aggressor
in the affray which ensued, then appellee in leaving a place of
safety and interceding in the affray had no more rights or immunities than did Bettilyon, and appellants were entitled to have
these propositions submitted to the jury as se't forth in appellants' requested Instruction Number 5, which is assigned as
Error N wnber 8. The requested Instruction reads as follows :
"You are instruc'ted that these defendants have
the full right to determine the operation of the scenic
racer and that they, through their servants, having determined not to operate the east set of tracks or green
cars, then Bernard L. B·ettilyon had no right to go on
that side of the racer platform. You are further in-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

48

structed that having gone on the east side if you find
that his being there did in any way interfere with or
cause trouble to defendants' servants in their operation
of the racer that the servants of defendants had a lawful
right to use such reasonable force as was necessary,
after requesting Bernard L. Bettilyon to leave that part
of defendants' property, to remove him from the place
in question. You are also instructed that if in using
force to remove said B·ernard L. Bettilyon that he attempted to or did start to fight or hit the servant or
servants of defendants and as a result of such assault
or attempted assault the said Bernard L. Bettilyon
was later injured, and that thereafter this plaintiff's
husband voluntarily came into the fight and that later
this plaintiff herself left a place of safety and slapped
defendants' employee in the face, as a result of which
plaintiff was struck by said employee, then plaintiff
cannot recover in this case and your verdict will be
for the defendants, and ·each of 'them, 'no cause of
action.' " (Exception Tr. 251)
The requested instruction clearly states a theory of the
case relied on by appellants and the trial court erred in refusing
to give the instruction or a similar instruction that would present to the jury the appellants' defense.
In 6 C. !. Sec. at pages 815 and 816 the rule is stated as
follows:

A person interfering on ano-ther's behalf enjoys
no further immunity than the person attacked. Hence,
both must be free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, the apparent danger must be such as to induce
one exercising a reasonable and proper judgment to
interfere to prevent a consummation of the injury, the
force employed should not be more than appears to be
reasonably necessary, the reasonableness thereof to be
judged by the situation as it reasonably appeared to
a
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defendant at the time of the assault. ~V hen the danger
is 01.'erj justification for the use of violence is at an

end.

***

"Since, however, the person interfering on behalf
of another enjoys no further or greater immunity than
the person attacked, as stated supra in subdivision a
of this section, defendant not only must be free from
fault himself, but there must also be freedom from
fault on the part of the person he seeks to protect. Acco·rdingly, if the person defended was not free from
fault, his protector cannot claim intmunity. Further1nore, before a person is justified in using force to protect ntembers of his family, the apparent danger must
be such as to induce one exercising a reasonable and
proper judgment to interfere to prevent a consummation of the injury, and no more force must be used than
is reasonably necessary for such purpose.· If the danger
has passed justification for the use of violence is at an
end."

'lJ.

The same rule is clearly announced in the case of Morris
McClellan (Ala.) 45 So. 641, at page 645, as follows:
uwhere one, standtng in the relation that authorizes
him under the law to strike in the protection of another,
is sued for an assault and battery for striking in protection of such other one, and undertakes to set up justification in defense of the action, there must not only be
freedom from fault on the part of the person he sought
to protect_. but freedom from fault on his own part, as
well as a necessity to commit the battery."

In Roberson v. Stokes, et al (N. C. 106 S.E. 151, action
for assault and battery was brought by the plaintiff against W.
G. Stokes and another. The verdict was against the plaintiff
and from the judgment entered thereon plaintiff appealed. The
appellate court in granting a new trial said and held :
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"It was erroneous to charge the jury as set forth
in the above statement of the case for two reasons:
( 1) It was based upon the assumption that .defendants'
version of the assault" was the correct one, whereas there
was evidence that defendants were tn the wrong
throughout, and the jury therefore had the law stated
to them with only a partial and contracted view of the
evidence. This method of charging. a jury has been
disapproved by us. Where a phase of the evidence is
presented to the jury, both contentions in regard to it
should be given; otherwise it might cause the jury to
give undue weight and significance to the one stated.
The very question was discussed in Jarrett v. Trunk
Co., 144 N. C. 299, 56 S. E. 937, where it was said that,
although it be not error generally to refrain from giving instructions. unless asked to do so, yet care must
be taken when the judge thinks proper to instruct the
jury upon a phase of the evidence and to expound the
law in relation thereto, not only to state it correctly,
but to state the law as applicable to the respective contentions of each party upon such phase of the evidence.
Having undertaken to tell the jury how they should
answer that V.Ssue if they found such· facts according to
plaintiff's contention, it was manifestly incumbent upon
the court to state the defendants' contentions in respect
to such phase of the evidence and to instruct the jury
how to answer the issue should they sustain such contention. State v. Austin, 79 N.C. 626; Burton v. Railroad, 84 N. C. 197; Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N. C. 636;
State v. Wolf, 122 N. C. 1081, 29 S. E. 841.
"The phase mentioned by his honor was flatly
denied by the plaintiff, and a very different complexion
given to it by him. The judge's illustration, based, as
it was, on the assumption that plaintiff was the sole
aggressor, and that W. G. Stokes did nothing to bring
on the fight, but was illegally assaulted by the plaintiff
and knocked down, was not justified by the evidence, as
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there was plenty of evidence to show that it was not
true, but that the defendants were the aggressors, W.
G. Stokes having attempted lto attack the plaintiff with
a brick, and that the latter acted in self-defense, and
that the other defendant wrongfully and unlawfully
joined in the attack upon him, having no just or legal
ground for his intervention, which was simply voluntary
and gratuitous on his part. It was therefore required,
under the principle stated in Jarrett v. Trunk Co.,
supra, and the ·cases therein cited, that the judge should
have stated both sides of .the evidence bearing on that
particular phase. Such an instruction was peculiarly
required, under the circumstances of this case, and the
incompleteness of the one given, in the respect indicated, may have turned the scales against the plaintiff, and
probably did. What the judge did say afterwards was
not sufficient to cure the error. * * * "
"The son could do only what his father could
rightfully do, and must be judged by his rights and
responsibilities, 'because,' as Hale said, 'they are in a
mutual relation one to another.' The jury must find
the facts, including the necessity of intervention by the
son, and whether he kept within his privilege."
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 10
Appellants' Assignment of Error Number 10 is that the
court erred in refusing to give their requested Instruction N umber 7, which reads as follows:
"You are instructed that Bernard L. Bettilyon had
no right to be on the east or green car side of the platform in question without the consent of defendants.
So, if you find that he, ibeing on that side without right,
refused to leave the east side of said platform when so
requested by defendants' servants and that said servants
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then went to said Bernard L. Bettilyon at his dare and
invitation to induce him to vacate the east side of said
platform, and that as a result of the effort of defendants' servants to induce him to leave that part of defendants' premises the said Bernard L. Bettilyon, while
said servants were in the exercise of only such reasonable force as was necessary to remove plaintiff, struck
at defendants' servant and started to fight as a result
of which he suffered some injury, then the plaintiff in
this case cannot justify herself in leaving a place of
safety and committing an assault upon the employee
of these defendants and therefore plaintiff cannot recover in this case and your verdict must be for the defendants, and ea·ch of them, and against the plaintiff'no cause of action.'" (Exception Tr. 251-252)
The request embodies substantially the same elements as
appellants' Request Number 5 and could have been given in
lieu of that instruction to present appellants' defense to the
action. The refusal to give either of the requests or to cover
the proposition contained therein by any other instruction is
obviously reversible error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 11
Appellants have assigned as error Number 11 the trial
court's refusal to give their requested Instruction Number 8,
which is as follows :
"You are instructed that the lawful owner or occupant of premises may rightfully restrict the use of
his premises to his business guests and this he may do
by word of mouth a well as by erecting signs or barricades or by using other means of giving notice of the
restricted use. If a business .guest refuses to quit a
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restricted portion of the owner's or occupant's premises
after verbal request so to do, and reasonable opportunity
has been given him to depart, he thereby becomes a
trespasser and may be ejected by the use of such reasonable force as is necessary under the circumstances. So,
in this case, if you find the acts of which the plaintiff
complains arose out of the use of such force on the
part of the employees of the defendants or an exercise
on their part of the right to defend themselves against
attack by 1\Ir. Bettilyon, then plaintiff cannot recover in
this action." (Exception Tr. 252)
The principle of law relied on by appellants in this requested instruction is clearly stated in 6 C.!. Sec'. at pages 819
and 820, as follows:
"Reasonable force rna y be used to prevent a trespass on one's property or to eject a trespasser or intruder thereon.
"A lawful owner or occupant of premises, or one
claiming title and rightfully in possession, may retain
possession and use such force as rna y be reasonably
necessary to prevent an unlawful entry, or to remove
trespassers or intruders, or persons, originally on the
premises by license or permission, who refuse to leave
on request, and are given a reasonable time in which to
do so, * * * ."
In Johnson v. Huntsman, 60 Utah, 402; 209 Pac. 197, at
page 201, the Supreme Court of Utah cites with approval the
rule stated in 2 R. C. L. at page 559, a:s follows:
"It is a well-settled principle that the occupant of
any house, ,store, or other building has the legal right
to control it, and to admit whom he pleases to enter
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and remain !there, and that he also has the right to expel
from the room or building any one who abuses the
privilege which has been thus given him. Therefore,
while the entry by one person on the premises of another
may be lawful, by reason of express or implied invitation to enter, his failure to depart} on the request of
the owner will ma;ke him a trespasser} and justify the
owner in using reasonable force to eject him.JJ
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 12
As previously pointed out in this brief it is appellants'
theory, sustained by their evidence, that at least two times after
the fracas started that it came to an end, and was then started
again either by appellee's brother Lou or by herself without any
real cause.
There is no question but what Bernard Lynch (Slim) came
into the affray. All the witnesses saw him there, although
appellee's witnesses do not ascribe to him. his doing what he and
appellants' witnesses s3lid that he did in trying to end the affair. His testimony as to what he saw and did in connection
with the affair is as follows :
That the first time he saw Earl Cochran and Mr. Bettilyon, Earl was standing in the pit motioning for Mr. Bettilyon
to go out. At that time Bernard was going out of the aisle
that the unloaded passengers from the west side of the cars
followed to get out. The next time he saw Earl he was on the
platform with Mr. Bettilyon, trying to push him· toward the
front. (Tr. 224) They started scuffling and fighting there
and
"I saw Mr. Webb coming down the same side
toward them and so I ,climbed over the fence at about
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point 'D' and went around on that side to see where
they were. At that time Earl, Mr. Bettilyon, Mr.
Webb and Jack were there together. I took hold of
Mr. Bettilyon's arm from the back and tried to turn
him around and take him out. I said if they wanted
him to get out of there he had better get out. I tried
to take him down toward the opening marked 'P.' ~I
took him a few feet and he wrenched loose from me
and went back in to where they were scuffling. (Tr.
225) When he wrenched loose from me and went
back in there I started towards him and just then Mr.
Lampere hit him and he fell down on the floor. During
the time I was holding him there was no one right
around us then. They were down quite a few feet
further than that." (Tr. 226)
With this evidence, which was also the evidence of appellants' other witnesses, before the court, we submitted to the
court our request Number 9 reading as follows :
"You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that when Bernard Lynch went into the trouble
going on at the place in question here the altercation
was brought to a stop by his taking hold of Mr. Bettilyon and attempting to get him away from the trouble
and that Mr. Bettilyon then broke away from him and
charged at Jack Lampere, who at that time in selfdefense struck Mr. Bettilyon, that then Mr. Bettilyon
was the aggressor; and if you further find that Mr.
Webb was still in the altercation along with Mr. Bettilyon then I instruct you that plaintiff had no right to
leave a place of safety, go up to Mr. Lampere and strike
him·, and that she cannot recover in this action against
these defendants." (Exception Tr. 252)
The court refused to give said request and in his instruc-
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tions as given to the jury did not cover the point in any way.
That appellants were entitled to such an instruction is sustained
by the following cases:

3 Reid's Bra:nson Inst. 106 Sec. 753.
In Miller v. Trascher (La.) 145 So. 27, young Miller
threw a rock and struck defendant's son, then went over and
sat down. Trascher senior struck young Miller. · The latter
through his parents sued Trascher. The court in sustaining
judgment for Miller says that no further attack by Miller
seemed evident therefore the blow by Trascher was not justified.
Clearly here the evidence shows that if Lou Betti lyon
had followed out "Slim's" directions there would have been no
further action, and no excuse for appellee striking Jack as she
did. Appellants were entitled to have this issue submitted to
the jury.
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 15
The assignment s'tates that the court erred in failing and
refusing to instruct on appellants' theory of their defense. We
have pointed out above the requests made of the court for instructions on appellants' defenses, all of which were refused.
Now we will consider the instructions given by the court.
Instructions Nos. 1 and 2 (Tr. 39-40) cover the pleadings.
Instruction No. 3 (appellee's request) (Tr. 4) defines abstractly assault and battery. Instruction No. 4 (appellee's request) (Tr. 42) says plaintiff was a gue·st at Saltair for the
entire evening. Instruction No. 5 (appellee's request) (Tr.
43) says if appellee was apprehensive of bodily harm to husband

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

57
or brother she was justified in entering the affray, and i £ rendered unconscious her participation would not prevent recovery.
Instruction No.6 (Tr. 44) says one may protect members
of his or her family provided danger appears.
Instruction No. 7 (appellee's request) (Tr. 45) instructs
as to pregnancy and miscarriage.
Instruction No.8 (appellants' request) (Tr. 46) instructs
that only three of the appellants' employees were mixed up in
the affray.
Instruction No. 9 (appellants' request) (Tr. 47) is repetitious of No. 6, setting out conditions under which appellee
was justified in entering combat.
Instructions No. 10 and 11, (Tr. 47-48) are as to damages
and the balance of the instructions ( Tr. 49) are the regular
form instructions usually given iby the court.
In all our experience in trial work over 30 years we have
never had a case where the court has so absolutely failed to
instruct on the issues involved. · The case to begin with was
complicated and in order to afford the appellants any consideration by the jury the defenses of the appellants as established by
evidence should have been called to the attention of the jury.
For the court to have so completely failed to give place to
appellants' defenses and theories requires without question a
reversal of the judgment entered in this case.
In Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co.J 57 Utah 7, 169
Pac. 868, the court said:
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his theory,
when there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the
jury and the judgment of the jury on the facts tending
to support such theory, assuming always that there is
testimony offered to support the same, and this court
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has so held in Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah, 121,
124 Pac. 522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it
is said:
"'There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each, on a
submission of the case to the jury, is entitled to a submission of it on his theory and the law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as to the cause of the accident is embodied in the proposed requests. There is
some evidence, as we have shown, to render them applicable to the case. That is not disputed. We think
the ·Court's refusal to charge substantially as requested
was error. That the ruling was prejudicial and works
a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and unavoidable·.' ''
This rule is restated and approved in M orga.n v. Bingham
Stage Lines Co. et al, 75 Ut. 87, 283 Pac. 160.

v.
ERRORS BASED UPON INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN
TO· JURY
The next series of Assignments go to the errors made by
the court in the instructions which he gave to the jury.
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 16
There is no question in the evidence that the appellee and
party paid their way into Saltair, nor is there any conflict about
Saltair and the Racer being under separate ownership and operation. It appears affirmatively in the record that for one to
ride the racer he must pay a fee in addition to the entrance
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fee to Saltair. Now in the face of such a record the court gave
as its instruction No. 4 appellee's request, reading:
"The court instructs you, if you find from. the evidence that the .plaintiff's admission to Saltair Beach
was paid, that she was a guest and had a right to remain
there as long as said resort remained open to the public
that evening." (Exception Tr. 246)
Clearly the evidence did not warrant such an instruction.
The jury, to give the court any credit for trying to say something relevant to the issues involved, must have understood the
court to say that the appellee and her party having paid their
way into Saltair were guests for the night on the Racer regardless of what happened or their actions in and about the Racer.
Such an instruction is most dangerous and gave the jury excuse
for speculation on points that are not involved in the case at
all. In this case there can be little doubt but that it worked
to the prejudice of the appellants.
This court in State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 22 Pac. (2d) 612, in setting out what an instruction should present said :
"It is necessary, however, that whatever theories
are presented by pleadings or otherwise, in order to be
entitled to be submitted by way of instructions to the
jury, some evidence must have been received by the
court in support of such theory. Instructions to a jury
must be responsive to the issues and of such nature that
they are applicable to the evidence received and submitted to the jury. * * *
"It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as
to the law applicable to the eVidence of the particular
case, having reference to the parties thereto."
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ASSIGNMENT OF ·ERROR N·OS. 17 AND 18
On the appellee's theory, that she had a right to leave a place
of safety and step out when all things were at rest, and say to
Jack Lam·pere, "You can't do that," and strike him. full in the
face, and recover from appellants damages because he in some
way struck her, the court gave the appellee's request as instruction No. 5 which read :
"The court instructs you if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was apprehensive that her hus~
band and brother, or either of them, were in danger of
bodily harm, and that she interceded in the affray in
order to try to protect either or both of them, that she
was justified. in doing so. If you further find from
the evidence that as a result of her participation in the
affray she was rendered unconscious by a blow from one
of the defendants' employees, the mere fact that she
participated in the affray would not bar her from recovering damages from the defendants." (Exception
Tr. 246)
We excepted to the instruction as a whole and then broke
it down into two parts and excepted to each part. Our excep...
tions are covered by the two assignments set out above.
Dividing the instruction into two parts, what does it say?
1. The jury is told that if they "find from the evidence
that the plaintiff was apprehensive tha:t her husband and brother
or either of them were in danger of bodily ha·rm, and that she
interceded in the affray in order to try to protect either or both
of them, 'that she was justified."
The one big defect in this instruction is that it assumes that
appellee's husband and brother were being unlawfully assaulted
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and that therefore the ·only question is as to her apprehension
concerning them. The evidence in this case goes both ways if
appellee's evidence is interpreted in her favor. Under appellants' evidence her relatives were the aggressors and under the
law she could be in no better position than they. Morris v.
M cClellanJ supra. For the court to leave out a submission of
the issue on all the evidence and to have made the assumption
which is made is prejudicial and constitutes reversible error.
2. The jury is told that if they find from the evidence "that
as a result of her participation in the affray she was rendered
unconscious by a blow from one of the defendants' employees,
the mere fact that she participated in the affray would not bar
her from recovering damages.''
Here again is the basi-c assumption that appellee's relatives
were rightfully in the affray, and consequently that she was in
the same position. The appellants' position in the case was
entirely forgotten and was never in any instruction submitted
to the jury. Our evidence established appellee as the aggressor,
and that theory should have gone to the jury. 6 Corpus Juris
Sec. supra.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 19
Instruction No. 6 reads as follows :
"A person is justified in using sufficient force to
prot~ members of his or her family, provided the apparent danger is such as to induce one exercising a
reasonable and proper judgment to interfere to prevent
a consummation of the injury." (Tr. 246)
Here again the jury is told, without limitation that, applying the instruction to the appellee, regardless of the right or
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of her relatives or herself she had a right to interfere
in the altercation in question. Certain it is, with all the emphasis
on this point the j uty was thoroughly mislead as to the res pee•
tive tights of the patties irt this e<tse. In po .other way can the
result obtained here be acc·ounted for. The verd.ic~ was most
excessive.
Wtohg

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 20.AND 21
'

.

. Here our exceptions go to Instruction. No. 7 as a ~hole and
to its two separate parts. Taken as a whole we find .t~is is
what the jury was told:
"The court instructs you that if you believe from
the evidence, that the plaintiff was .pregnant at the 'time
she w,as rendered unconscious by the blow delivered by
·one of the defendants~ employees.
"And as a result ot said blow and being knocked
to the floor she suffered a miscatriag~ and thereby the
loss of her unborn ·Child you may award her monty
damages for the loss of said unborn child."
And as we read the instruction and . as it would most
probably be understood by the j uty the ~ourt instructed the
JUry:
If yoti beiieve frotn the ~vidence .that. ap~llee was pregnant (\vhen) at the time she was rendered unconscious by u the
blow" delivered by one of the defendant~ employees, and as
a result of said blow an.d being knocked to the floor she suffered
(what) a miscarriage and thereby the loss ·of her unborn child,
then she can recover her damage for the "lo~s of said unborn
child.''
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In other words, the court~ without reference to the disputed
facts in evidence, has peremptorily instructed the jury as to
the actcual existence of four sets of facts which are shown by
the evidence to be in great dispute. They are :
· 1. That she was rendered unconscious,
2. By athe blow" delivered by one of the defendants' employees,
3. That as a result of said blow., and
4. Being knocked to the floor.
The very sequence of the facts as to which the court in-:structed the jury are so closely tied up to the appellee's contention that the jury could not help but believe that the court meant
to tell them that those were all the facts that had any bearing
on the issues.
.

'

. Certainly such instruction was gross error on the part of
the court and exceedingly unfair to the appellants.
The nature of this case being predicated upon alleged
assault and battery is very like a crim-inal case wherein the
personal element is particularly present and the minds of the
jury are likely ·to be inflamed as a result of anything that is
said indicating that there was malice or viciousness in what
was done. For this reason the rule laid down by this court
·in State v. Seymour., 49 Utah 285, 163 Pac. 789; is particularly
in point. In that case the court says:
"The charge is, however, faulty for another reason. The court, in that portion of the charge we have
copied .above, assumed a very material fact to exist as
appears from the words we have italicized.
"The same vice, while not so pronounced, is also
'found in other portions of the charge, to which it will,
however. not be necessary to refer, for the reason that
the error will not occur again.
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ucaurts, in charging jurors., should be very careful not to assume any material fact or facts. Jurors,
who are laymen, are always eager to follow the opinion
or judgment of the court, and if the court assumes any
material fact in the charge, the jurors are most likely
to follow the assumptions of the court. Indee.d, we must
assume that such is the case unless the record clearly
shows the contrary."
This court again reaffirms this doctrine in State v. Hannah,
81 Utah 580, 21 P.a·c. (2d) 537, page 540:
"The jury to assume as proven any material controverted fact is held by this ·court in State v. Seymour,
49 Utah, 285, 163 p·. 789, 792, where the court, speaking through ·Chief Justice Frick, says: 'Courts, in
charging jurors, should be very careful not to assume
any material fact or facts. Jurors, who are laymen, are
always ea~iF to follow the opinion or judgment of the
court, and .it. the court assumed any material fact in the
charge, thl'j urors are most likely to follow the assumptions of the court. Indeed, we must assume that such
is the case ·unless the record clearly shows the contrary.'
"So thoroughly established is this principle that
it seems almost superfluous to cite authorities. ·When
the instruction without qualification assumed that the
offense had been committed, it thereby·relieved the jury
of the necessity of weighing the eviderice and determining for itself that question."
It was also error for the court to tell the jury that if they
believed she was pregnant and as a result of the blow suffered
a miscarriage the jury may award her money damages for the
loss of said unborn child. Such is· not the Ia w as is established
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by the cases cited below and argued under the next succeeding
assignments covering the instruction on damages.
See IVallace v. Portland Ry. L. P. Co.
(Or) 170 Pac. 283
Vitale ·v. Biando (Mo.) 52 S. W.
(2d) 24

VI.
ERRORS IN INSTRUCTION AS TO DAMAGES
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 22 AND 23
'In instruction No. 7 considered next above, the court in
the last half of the instruction twice emphasized the "unborn
child" idea and now in this instruction tells the jury she rnay
recover "for the loss of her unborn child'' when in fact the only
evidence she personally gave of such a being was that she had
missed her regular menstrual period some two weeks before the
trouble.
The instruction reads as follows :
"The court instructs you, members of the jury, that
if you find the issues in this case in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants, you may find for the plaintiff
such a sum as will compensate her for the following
damages, not to exceed $5,000.00:
"1. The actual personal injuries which she suffered;
"2. ·The consequent pain and suffering which she
suffered as a result of her physical injuries;
"3~ Money damages for the loss of her unborn
child as ~ result of said miscarriage.
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"In addition to the amount named above, you may
also assess such damages as will eompensate· for the
loss or injury to her clothing, not to exceed the sum of
$75.00." (Tr. 247-.248)
We took one exception to the instruction ·as a whole and
then exceptions to each separate paragraph of the instruction.
(Tr. 254-5)
·
It is our position that paragraph three statingt~at.appellee
can recover "money damages for the loss of her unbor;n child"
is had in and of itself and that it renders' the entire instruction
bad because read along with the other parts of the instruction it
leads the jury to award damages taking·all elements together,
··
which is not warranted under any theory.
The allegations or prayer of appellee's amended complaint
do not set out any basis for the giving of such an in:struction
nor is there any evidence of loss of companionship or ;value of
lost services to support the same. In addition such an element
of damage is fundamentally too remote.
. .
That the instruction and that particular par:t speci~~al.~y
excepted to is bad and not the law is forcibly set out by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in Wallace. v. Portland, Ry. L. P.
Co., supra, where the court said:

"Considering the first assignment of error, the
theory of the plaintiff advanced in support of the tes'ti-.
mony concerning the sex of the child and the.. state of
advancement of the fetal life was that it was 'material
to the mother with regard to loss 0£ service.' This was
referable to the allegation of the complaint about the
loss. of the child and the p~edication of damages thereon. No question is made, and there can be none, but
that a plaintiff, a pregnant woman, may ·recover for the
pain and injury, both physical and mental, experienced
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by her from a miscarriage brought about l:>y the negligent act of a defendant. She is entitled to h~ye nature
in such cases work out its proper function in due time.
Any disturbance of the period or proces~ of gestation
resulting in her injury is actionable. It i$ onlyJ however, for the inju-ry to her tha.t she can recovef!. She ha.s
110 action for .the loss of the child. The in.jt1ry, if any,
is too remote and speculative to form a basis for damages. The principle is succinctly stated in the closing
paragraph of a note to Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities R. R.
Co., 23 L.R~A. 142, thus:
" 'The review of the decisions shows that they are
in almost entire harmony in holding that miscarriage
may be one of the effect:s of wrong for which recovery
may be had. They also show that the effect on the
mother alpne is to b~ consid~red, and recovery for miscarriage allowed only so far as it is part of her personal
injuri~s, riot in.~luding any recompens~ for loss pf anticipated offspring.' " (citing ~ases).

The same rule is laid down jn Vitalf rq. Bia.ndo (Mo.)
supra. There th~ court stated :
"In this state of the record we have in mind th;;tt
the physical injuries suffered by~ f~male thrQpgh n~gli
gence of another, occasioning a miscarriage, will operate as~ cause of action in her favor to the extent that
she may be injured thereby in the impairment of health
and increased suffering of body and mind, occasioned
by the miscarriage, over and beyond that which usually
attends ~ birth in due cour&e, (Jut the lpss of th~ ()ifsPring itself is not to l}~ considere(l as an injury to her,
for the rea:son that the basis of a r~cov~ry on thf! part
of a parent for the death of a child by the 'pegligence of
another is the value of the services of the child 'to the
parent during minority, and therefore, a recovery for
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the loss of a prospective offspring, it is said, would extend the field of damage into the realm of mere possibility. 'Of course, the loss of the anticipated society
of the prospective child and mere matters of sentiment
which attend such misfortunes are too remote for consideration by the ·courts as a basis for monetary compensation, though the law be humane, in its policy and
purpose.' Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App.· 539, 138
S. W. 889, 892, and cases cited therein."
VII.
THE JUDGMENT IS EXCESSIVE AND IS
NOT SUSTAINED BY LAW
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO. 24
From the points discussed in this brief so far it seems to
us there can be no question but that the court erred in receiving
the verdict and entering judgment thereon, because it is es.tablished that the verdict is excessive and against the la~.
The event in issue here happened on June 22, 1940. The
appellee filed her complaint on September 6, 1940, and in that
complaint did not allege one fact to the effect that she was pregnant or that she had had a miscarriage. In fact she alleged an
entirely different set of facts than those alleged in her amended
complaint as a basis for her recovery. {Tr. 1-2-13A-13-C and
D).
By her own testimony she never went to see a doctor until
long after the complaint was filed. It was late in October, 1940,
when she went to see Dr. Giesy. Then nothing was said to
appellants about a claimed miscarriage until the 11th of December, 1940, when the parties were about to go to trial, at which
time, she filed art amendment to her complaint.
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As pointed out in the next preceding assignment the basis
given by the court upon which the jury was allowed to determine the damages in this case has no support in the law. Therefore it follows that the verdict must be excessive and the judgment against the law. It is impossible for the court to apportion the verdict to the different elements of damage set out by
the court in its instruction.

VIIL
COURT ERRED IN DENYTNG MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL
ASSIGNMENT Q.F ·ERROR NO. 25
The appellants within time, after entry of judgment in this
case, filed their motion for .a new trial which was argued to the
court. He denied the motion.
The grounds upon which we contend the court erred in
taking such action are fully argued in this brief and consequently there is no need to restate them here. It is our position that
the trial court should, based upon the errors committed in the
trial of the case~ have granted appellants a new trial.
In conclusion for the reasons stated in this brief appellants
pray this court that it reverse the judgment entered in this case
and remand said case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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